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Abstract. In this paper we propose an application-independent model
for the de¯nition of arti¯cial institutions that can be used to de¯ne open
multi-agent systems. Such a model of institutional reality makes us able
also to de¯ne an objective and external semantics of a commitment-based
Agent Communication Language (ACL). In particular we propose to re-
gard an ACL as a set of conventions to act on a fragment of institutional
reality, de¯ned in the context of an arti¯cial institution. Another contri-
bution of the work presented in this paper is an operational de¯nition
of norms, a crucial component of arti¯cial institutions. In fact in open
systems interacting agents might not conform to the speci¯cations. We
regard norms as event-driven rules that when are ¯red by events happen-
ing in the system create or cancel a set of commitments. An interesting
aspect of our proposal is that both the de¯nition of the ACL and the
de¯nition of norms are based on the same notion of commitment. There-
fore an agent capable of reasoning on commitments can reason on the
semantics of communicative acts and on the system of norms.
1 Introduction
In this paper we propose an application-independent model of institutional re-
ality that can be used to de¯ne open multi-agent systems as the rei¯cation of a
set of arti¯cial institutions and that makes us able to de¯ne the semantics of a
set of communicative acts suitable for agent communication.
Our approach to the de¯nition of communicative acts is based on the notion
of social commitment. In the last few years this concept has been largely used
by a growing number of researchers to de¯ne the semantics of Agent Commu-
nication Languages (ACLs). After the ¯rst studies carried out by Singh and by
Colombetti [34, 8], further investigations have been carried out from an opera-
tional point of view [17, 27], following a logical approach [36], and in the ¯eld
of argumentation studies [1, 5]. The main advantages of this approach are that
commitments are objective and independent of an agent's internal structure and
that it is possible to verify whether an agent is behaving according to the given
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semantics. Therefore the proposed ACL, unlike the ACLs that de¯ne the mean-
ing of communicative acts using agent's mental states [22, 15], is suitable to be
used in open systems where no constraints are imposed on the internal way of
reasoning of the interacting agents and where it is impossible to trust other
agents completely.
Social commitments are used to represent the evolution of social relation-
ships among agents during interactions. Communicative acts are then viewed as
actions carried out to modify social relationships among agents by creating, up-
dating or cancelling commitments according to a prede¯ned set of shared rules
[36, 18]. More precisely, we regard communicative acts as institutional actions,
that is, as actions performed within an institution to modify a fragment of social
reality [31]. De¯ning the semantics of an ACL has therefore two sides: one side
is the de¯nition of the institutional e®ects brought about by the performance of
communicative acts; the other side is the de¯nition of the social context in which
agents can carry out institutional actions, and that we call arti¯cial institutions.
Indeed, our main tenet is that without the de¯nition of appropriate institutions
it is impossible to specify the semantics of an ACL.
An important component of our model of arti¯cial institutions is the de¯ni-
tion of norms. In fact in open systems there is the risk that the agents do not
conform to the speci¯cations. We regard norms as event-driven rules that, when
are ¯red by events happening in the system, create or cancel a set of commit-
ments. Therefore a crucial aspect of the proposed model is that the de¯nition of
the ACL and the de¯nition of norms are based on the same concept: the notion of
commitment. As a consequence an agent capable of reasoning on commitments
can reason on the semantics of communicative acts and on the system of norms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our model of
arti¯cial institutions that consists of the fundamental concepts on which we
base our treatment of agent communication. In Section 3 we introduce the Basic
Institution, which de¯nes the notion of social commitment as an institutional
entity and which regulates their management.
In Section 4 we consider a further component of arti¯cial institution, namely
norms. We then give two examples of applications of our model: in Section 5 we
delineate a FIPA-like library of communicative acts by de¯ning a set of institu-
tional actions and suitable conventions for their performance and in Section 6 we
give a partial description of a speci¯c arti¯cial institution, that is, the institution
of English Auction. In Section 7 we brie°y remark on related works present in
this volume. Finally in Section 8 we draw some conclusions and delineate some
directions for future work.
2 Arti¯cial Institutions
We view a multiagent system (MAS) as a technological extension of human
society, by which individual persons and human organizations can delegate the
execution of institutional actions to an arti¯cial system. Examples of such actions
are establishing appointments, signing contracts, and carrying out commercial
transactions. For this reason there are strong connections between some aspects
of a MAS and some aspects of human society, and therefore the concepts used to
model a MAS interaction framework have to re°ect some crucial characteristics
of their human counterparts. For this reason in creating our model of arti¯cial
institutions we draw inspiration from philosophical studies about social reality
and human communication [30, 31].
The word institution is normally used with di®erent meanings. An institution
can be seen as an established organization (especially of a public character)
with a code of law, like for example a hospital or a university. With a di®erent
meaning, the word is used to refer to a set of concepts that exist only thanks to
the common agreement of a community of agents, like for example in the case
of money, ownership, or marriage.
In multiagent systems research the term electronic institution is commonly
used to refer to a speci¯c organization [12] or to an abstract pattern that regu-
lates the interaction among agents [35]. On the contrary, we use the term \ar-
ti¯cial institution" to refer to the description of shared concepts and rules that
create and regulate a fragment of social reality. In this perspective a concrete
open MAS is a rei¯cation of one or more arti¯cial institutions.
In our view, the speci¯cation of an arti¯cial institution consists of the fol-
lowing components:
{ the core ontology, that is, the de¯nition of the institutional concepts intro-
duced by the institution and of the institutional actions that operate on
them;
{ a set of authorizations specifying which agents are empowered to perform
institutional actions;
{ a set of conventions for the concrete performance of institutional actions;
{ a set of norms that impose obligations and prohibitions on the agents that
interact within the MAS.
Of course, in order that the proposed model can be used in real applications
it is necessary that these fundamental concepts, used to de¯ne the structure
of institutions, are collectively accepted by the designers of open interaction
frameworks and by the designers of arti¯cial agents that will interact with that
framework.
2.1 The core ontology: entities and attributes
The context within which arti¯cial agents operate can be modelled as consist-
ing of a set of entities that can have natural or institutional attributes, that is,
attributes that exist only thanks to the common agreement of the interacting
agents (or more precisely of their users). For example, the color of a book is a
natural attribute, while the book's price is an institutional attribute. Natural
attributes are assumed to re°ect the physical properties of the corresponding
entities of the real world, and typically cannot be changed by arti¯cial agents
(unless the agent controls a physical robot). On the contrary, institutional at-
tributes can be a®ected by institutional actions performed by software agents.
Sometimes, core ontologies de¯ne entities whose attributes are only institu-
tional. We refer to such entities as institutional entities. As will be described in
Section 3, social commitments are the fundamental institutional entities, because
they are essential to express the meaning of various communicative acts.
2.2 Institutional actions
Institutional actions are a particular type of actions [10] that are crucial for
the formalization of communicative interactions taking place in open systems.
The e®ect of institutional actions is to change institutional attributes, which
exist only thanks to common agreement. Therefore, agents cannot perform such
actions by exploiting causal links occurring in the natural world, as would be
done to open a door or to remove a physical object. Rather, as we shall see,
institutional actions are performed on the basis of a particular construct: the
\counts-as" relation.
Because of their intrinsic social nature, a crucial condition for the actual
performance of institutional actions is that they are public, that is, made known
to the relevant agents by means of some action that can be directly executed
by an arti¯cial agent. It is therefore natural to assume that all institutional
actions are performed by sending suitable messages to the relevant agents. An
example of institutional action is the act of opening an auction; as we shall
see, an agent (the auctioneer) can perform such an action by sending a suitable
message to the relevant group of agents (the participants). However, the act of
sending the message is merely instrumental, and should not be confused with
the institutional action of opening the auction.
In the literature, mechanisms di®erent from message exchange have also been
considered. For example, the use of blackboards for MAS has been proposed for
regulating interaction in open systems by several authors, i.e. [38]. It is worth
noticing, however, that FIPA standards see agents as entities that communicate
only by ACL messages. In any case, we think that the change of an institutional
attribute, like the one representing that an auction is open, always corresponds
to the execution of a speech act, namely, a declaration. When agents use a
blackboard, the declaration is performed by writing a suitable data structure on
the blackboard, and no message is exchanged among the agents. But still, the
institutional action is performed by executing a lower-level, conventional action
(writing on a blackboard instead of exchanging a message).
We de¯ne institutional actions by specifying their preconditions and postcon-
ditions, therefore abstracting from the way in which such actions are concretely
carried out. More precisely, an institutional action is characterized by:
{ an action name followed by a possibly empty list of parameters;
{ a possibly empty set of preconditions, which specify the values that certain
institutional attributes must have for the action to be meaningful (for ex-
ample, opening an auction is meaningful only if the auction is not already
open);
{ a nonempty set of postconditions, which typically represent the e®ects of the
action, that is, specify the values of certain institutional attributes after the
performance of the action (for example an auction is necessarily open after
opening it).
As we will see later in Section 5, communicative acts are a particular type of
institutional actions.
2.3 Instrumental actions
As we have already remarked, an institutional action is performed by executing
an instrumental action conventionally associated to the institutional action. In
the human world such instrumental actions vary from certain bodily movements
(raising one's arm to vote), to the use of speci¯c physical tools (waving a white
°ag to surrender), to the use of language (saying \the auction is open" to open
an auction). In a system of arti¯cial agents, it is natural to assume that all
institutional actions are performed by means of a single type of instrumental
actions, namely exchanging a message.
For the purposes of the current treatment, a message consists of: a message
type, a sender, one or more receivers, and a content. The action of exchanging a
message will be represented with the following notation:
exchMsg(message type; sender; receiver(s); content)
Note that here sender and receiver are just ¯elds of a message. That such
¯elds correctly represent the agent that actually sends the message and the
agents to which the message is delivered has to be guaranteed by the underlying
message transport system.
2.4 The \counts-as" relation
What is the relation that binds the performance of an instrumental action to the
performance of an institutional action? Following Searle [31], the construction of
social reality in the human world is possible thanks to constitutive rules of the
form X counts as Y in C. When X and Y are actions, such constitutive rules
make it the case that performing an action of type X in context C counts as
performing an action of type Y . In an arti¯cial system the \counts-as" relation
can be used to bind the performance of a message exchange to the correspond-
ing institutional action, if certain contextual conditions are satis¯ed. In such
a case, constitutive rules of the form X counts as Y in C represent linguistic
conventions, which associate an institutional e®ect (Y ) to the performance of a
message exchange (X) in a suitable context (C). In this paper, the treatment of
the counts-as relation is only concerned with such linguistic conventions. Thefore
we do not deal with other aspects of counts-as, like for example classi¯cation in
context, which in the area of arti¯cial institutions has been proposed as a mech-
anism for the re¯nement of abstract norms [23].
Conventions In order to be able to model the connection between X and Y
we introduce the notion of convention, that is, an agreement about what type
of message is bound to a given type of institutional action. In our model the
de¯nition of a convention has the following generic form:
exchMsg(message type; sender; receivers;content) =conv
iaction(parameters)
In Section 5 some useful conventions will be de¯ned for the performance of
institutional actions (in particular communicative acts).
Contextual conditions By itself, a convention is not su±cient to guarantee
the successful performance of an institutional action by the exchange of the
appropriate message: indeed, some additional conditions about the agent that
sends the message, about the agents that receive the message, and about the
state of the system in relation to the content of the message must be satis¯ed.
Conditions on the sender of the message. In general, an agent must be au-
thorized to perform an institutional action; for example, only the auctioneer has
the power to open an auction by sending a suitable message to the participants.
Moreover an authorization can be given only if certain conditions about the
state of the system, expressed by suitable Boolean expressions, are satis¯ed. For
example, it may be established that an auction is validly opened only if there are
at least two participants. Assuming that every agent in the interaction system
has an identi¯er (agent id), authorizations will be represented with the following
notation:
Auth(agent id; iaction(parameters); conditions)
Our notion of authorization should not be confused with the notion of permis-
sion. The distinction we make between these two concepts is similar to the one
between institutionalized power and permission proposed by Jones and Sergot in
[24] and further discussed in [3]. While authorizations are necessary conditions
for the valid performance of institutional actions, permissions are brought about
by the absence of norms (see Section 4), that is, by rules that a®ect the normative
positions of the agents in the system. The crucial di®erence between authoriza-
tions and permissions is highlighted in the cases when they are not granted. If an
agent is not authorized to perform an institutional action, a performance of the
corresponding instrumental action does not count as a performance of the insti-
tutional action (the institutional action is thus not executed). On the contrary,
if an authorized agent performs an institutional action that is prohibited by a
norm, the institutional action is successfully performed, but the agent violates
the norm and may be sanctioned for its behavior.
In the speci¯cation of an interaction system it is useful to express authoriza-
tions in term of the roles ¯lled by agents, in order to abstract from the concrete
agents that are actually involved in an interaction. For example, the authoriza-
tion to open and close an auction is granted to the agent that ¯lls the role of
the auctioneer, independently of its individual identity. We can then abstractly
de¯ne the authorization to perform a speci¯c institutional action (with given
parameters) associating it to a role:
Auth(role; iaction(parameters); conditions)
In a concrete interaction, starting from the authorizations given in terms of
roles and reasoning on agent roles, it is possible to detect if a given agent is
authorized to perform a certain institutional action.
Conditions about the receivers of the message. A message must be received by
all agents that play a role in the institutional reality a®ected by the performance
of the act. For example if the institutional action operates on a commitment, its
debtor and/or its creditor (depending on who is the actor of the action) have to
receive the message; in the case that the institutional action opens an auction,
the participants in the auction have to be the receivers of the message.
Conditions about the state of the system. All the preconditions of the institu-
tional action associated to the performance of the exchange of the message must
be satis¯ed.
Figure 1 schematically depicts how the \counts-as" relation works: an actual
exchange of a message counts as the performance of a particular institutional
action if there is a convention that binds the two acts and the relevant contextual
conditions are satis¯ed.
an event: the actual
exchange of a message
action 
types exchMsg(type,sender,receiver,content)
counts as
- conventions
- contextual conditions
iaction(parameters)
Fig. 1. The \counts-as" relation.
3 The Basic Institution
In [17{19] we have proposed to de¯ne the semantics of ACLs starting from the
assumption that the performance of certain communicative acts in a open multi-
agent system has the e®ect of changing the social relationship between the sender
and the receivers, and that this change can be represented by means of an in-
stitutional entity, that is, social commitment. To specify the meaning of various
types of communicative acts in terms of e®ects on commitments, it is necessary
to de¯ne an ontology of commitment, the institutional actions necessary to op-
erate on commitments, and a set of authorizations for the performance of these
institutional actions. As we shall see, all institutional actions on commitments
can be performed by means of a basic communicative act: the declaration. In
Section 5 we will de¯ne a set of conventions necessary to perform some type of
communicative acts directly by the exchange of a suitable message.
Commitment entities are fundamental not only for the de¯nition of the se-
mantics of an ACL but also for the de¯nition of the semantics of norms as we
will see in Section 4. Therefore in this section, using the concepts de¯ned so
far for describing the institutions that characterize an open interaction frame-
work, we will de¯ne the Basic Institution, that is, the institution that de¯nes
and regulates the management of commitments.
Further institutions, that we call special institutions, can then be de¯ned to
model the aspects of institutional reality typical of certain application domains.
For instance, for electronic commerce applications it will be necessary to model
the institutions of ownership, money, business transactions, auctions, and so on.
A formal speci¯cation of the English Auction as a special institution is given in
Section 6.
3.1 The Ontology of Commitment
We regard a commitment as an institutional entity with the following attributes:
a debtor, a creditor, a content, and a state which is used to keep track of the
temporal evolution of the commitment. We assume that given a debtor, a cred-
itor, and a content a commitment could be univocally identi¯ed. Commitments
will be represented with the following notation:
Comm(state; debtor; creditor; content)
The content of a commitment is represented by means of a temporal proposi-
tion (for a detailed treatment of temporal propositions see [18, 9]) that relates a
state of a®airs or the performance of an action to an interval of time. Temporal
propositions are characterized by a statement having the following expression-
Type: action, proposition, or referential expression, which is referred to a speci¯c
interval of time with two di®erent modes: 8 and 9. It is up to a \noti¯er",
connected with the meaning of the statement, to change the state from unde-
¯ned(?), to true, or false. If the mode is 9 and the statement becomes true at
any point of the time interval the noti¯er sets the state to true; otherwise the
noti¯er sets the state to false when the time interval expires. If the statement
is negated, the noti¯er sets the state to false when the statement becomes true,
otherwise it sets the state to true at the end of the time interval. The mode
8 is treated as the dual of 9. Temporal propositions are represented with the
following notation:
TP (statement; [tstart; tend];mode; state)
For example the following temporal proposition (used in Section 6.3) can be
used to monitor that a certain auction, identi¯ed by an id is actually opened
between now and now + ± is:
TP (openAuction(id); [now; now+±];9;?)
We perceive that commitments to actions and commitments to propositions
have di®erent aspects [39], but a detailed treatment of these is beyond the scope
of this paper.
The state of a commitment undergoes the life cycle described by the state
diagram of Figure 2, and changes as an e®ect of the execution of institutional
actions (solid lines) or of environmental events (dotted lines). Relevant events are
due to the change of the truth-value of the commitment's content. In particular
by de¯nition a commitment is ful¯lled when its content becomes true and is
violated when its content becomes false.
content.truth_value=1 
makeCommitment 
setPending 
violated 
 
fulfilled 
 
setCancel 
setCancel 
content.truth_value=0 
content.truth_value=1 
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Fig. 2. The life-cycle of commitments.
The creditor of a commitment can be a single agent or a group of agents. It
is important to remark that a commitment taken with a group of agents need
not be equivalent to a conjunction of commitments taken with every member of
the group. This point has been thoroughly analyzed in the literature [7, 11] and
will not be dealt here.
In our approach commitments can be created by individual agents through
the execution of communicative acts or by the activation of norms and which
generate commitments for agents in virtue of their role in an institution.
Institutional actions on commitment The institutional actions that op-
erate on commitments are de¯ned below; preconditions and post-conditions are
described using Object Constraint Language (OCL) [29]. The makeCommitment
action creates a new unset commitment if a commitment with the same debtor,
creditor, and content does not exist yet:
name :makeCommitment(debtor; creditor; content)
pre : not Comm:allInstances()! exists(cjc:debtor = debtor
and c:creditor = creditor and c:content = content)
post : Comm:allInstances()! exists(cjc:state = unset and c:debtor
= debtor and c:creditor = creditor and c:content = content)
The setCancel action changes the state of an existing unset or pending com-
mitment to cancelled :
name : setCancel(debtor; creditor; content)
pre : Comm:allInstances()! exists(cj(c:state = unset or
c:state = pending) and c:debtor = debtor and c:creditor =
creditor and c:content = content)
post : Comm:allInstances()! exists(cjc:state = cancelled and c:debtor
= debtor and c:creditor = creditor and c:content = content)
Finally the setPending action transforms an unset commitment to a pending
one:
name : setPending(debtor; creditor; content)
pre : Comm:allInstances()! exists(cjc:state = unset and c:debtor
= debtor and c:creditor = creditor and c:content = content)
post : Comm:allInstances()! exists(cjc:state = pending and c:debtor
= debtor and c:creditor = creditor and c:content = content)
For convenience, we also de¯ne the action makePendingCommitment, which
corresponds to the sequential execution of makeCommitment and setPending.
MakePendingCommitment therefore creates a pending commitment if it is not
the case that there exists a commitment with the same creditor, debtor, and
content.
name :makePendingCommitment(debtor; creditor; content)
pre : not Comm:allInstances()! exists(cjc:debtor = debtor
and c:creditor = creditor and c:content = content)
post : Comm:allInstances()! exists(cjc:state = pending and c:debtor
= debtor and c:creditor = creditor and c:content = content)
3.2 Authorizations
We de¯ne a set of authorizations concerning the creation and the manipulation
of commitments. Such authorizations will be associated with the two roles intro-
duced by commitments themselves: the role of debtor and the role of creditor.
Moreover, we assume a universal role, RegAgt, that every registered agent plays
throughout its lifetime.
{ Any registered agent can create an unset commitment with any other regis-
tered agent as debtor or creditor:
Auth(RegAgt;makeCommitment(debtor; creditor; content); true);
{ the debtor of an unset commitment can set it to pending :
Auth(Comm(debtor; creditor; content):debtor;
setPending(debtor; creditor; content); true);
{ the debtor of an unset commitment can set it to cancelled :
Auth(Comm(unset; debtor; creditor; content):debtor;
setCancel(debtor; creditor; content); true);
{ the creditor of a commitment can set it to cancelled :
Auth(Comm(debtor; creditor; content):creditor;
setCancel(debtor; creditor; content); true);
{ since a registered agent can create an unset commitment with itself as debtor
and any other agent as creditor, and the debtor of an unset commitment
can set it to pending, a registered agent is authorized to create a pending
commitment with itself as debtor and any other agent as creditor:
Auth(RegAgt;
makePendingCommitment(RegAgt; creditor; content); true).
Notice that these authorizations allow an agent to perform all communicative
acts de¯ned in Section 5. New authorizations may be introduced within special
institutions.
In general, institutions also de¯ne sets of norms to regulate the behavior
of agents. In our current view, the Basic Institution does not specify norms.
However, norms are introduced by most special institutions, as exempli¯ed by
the special institution of English Auction described in Section 6.
4 Norms
In a special institution, the execution of an action by an authorized agent often
needs to be regulated by another fundamental component of arti¯cial institu-
tions, that is, a system of norms. For example, the auctioneer of an English Auc-
tion not only is authorized to declare who is the winner, but it is also obliged to
do so in certain circumstances. Furthermore, there are conditions under which
it is forbidden to the auctioneer to declare an agent as the winner (for instance
during a period of time reserved for o®ers).
Norms prescribe which institutional actions should or should not be executed
among those that are authorized. In doing so, norms play an important function,
in that when they are respected norms make an agent's behavior at least partially
predictable and allow agents to coordinate and plan their actions according to
the expected behavior of the others, as studied in [28, 4]. We think that norms
can also be used to specify protocols, because they can dictate that in certain
circumstances an agent should not perform several kinds of communicative acts,
it ought to send a given type of message or react to a message in a speci¯c way.
How this can be done will be shown in Section 6.
We regard norms as event-driven rules that ¯re under appropriate conditions
and, by doing so, create, update or cancel commitments a®ecting a prede¯ned
set of agents. To de¯ne our model of norms and how they react to events, in
[20] we have proposed to model type of events as stereotyped classes [6] having
attributes that provide information about the state transition that caused them.
In our formalization we have singled out three main categories of events:
{ TimeEvents, which occur when the system reaches a certain instant of time;
{ ChangeEvents, which happen when an institutional entity changes in some
way, for example when an attribute modi¯es its value;
{ ActionEvents, which happen when an agent perform an action (an interesting
type of this kind of events is exchMsg (see Section 2.3), which represents the
act of sending a message).
The de¯nition of event types allows us to describe event templates [20], that is,
event types with some restrictions on certain attributes that describe a set of
possible event occurrences.
A norm is de¯ned within an institution and observes an entity of that institu-
tion by registering an event template to be noti¯ed whenever an event matching
the template occurs. Typically, interesting event types are not only communica-
tive acts like in [13], but also the ¯lling of a role by an agent, a value change
of an institutional attribute, the reaching of certain instants of time, and so on.
When an event matches the given descriptor, the corresponding norm is ¯red,
its variable e is ¯lled with the event, and the norm is activated.
When a norm ¯res, it is applied to a collection of liable agents described by
a suitable selection expression; in general, the collection of liable agents corre-
sponds to the set of agents that play a given role in the institution. For every
liable agent, the norm creates, updates or cancels a set of commitments.
In our model, when an agent ¯lls a role in a software system implementing
an institution, the norms of that institution will create commitments binding
the agent to the system, which is itself regarded as an agent. The identity of the
creditor agent allows us to keep trace of the commitments created by a system
and thus, in case of need depending on the application domain, to distinguish
them from the ones created by other agents.
The general structure of a norm can be described as follows:
within context name: ientity
on e: event template
if contextual conditions then
foreach agent in liable agents
do fcommActionDescription(agent; system; parameters)g+
Many studies have been devoted to the analysis of the relationship holding
between norms and commitments, which is often perceived as a fundamental
aspect of institutions [12] and organizations [7]. For example in [14] commitments
are viewed as a specialization of norms, while in [7] and [33] norms are a special
kind of commitments, called metacommitments.
From our point of view, norms are not themselves commitments, but rules
that manipulate commitments of the agents engaged in an interaction. In fact,
norms are associated to roles rather than to individual agents; they do not have
a debtor or a creditor, and strictly speaking they cannot be ful¯lled or violated.
Indeed, what can be ful¯lled or violated is not a norm, but commitments created
by the application of a system of norms, which represent agents' obligations and
prohibitions. More precisely, obligations are commitments to perform an action
of a given type, and prohibitions are commitments not to perform an action of a
given type. We interpret the absence of positive or negative commitments to the
execution of an action of a given type as permissions. This means that in our
framework every action is permitted unless it is explicitly forbidden. Other au-
thors [3, 2] take a di®erent standpoint, and assume that every action is prohibited
unless it is explicitly permitted. We ¯nd this choice rather unnatural, because
it makes it necessary to explicitly specify all actions that may be performed
without incurring a violation.
Usually in the agent literature authorization is not distinguished from per-
mission. For example, in [13] agent interactions are speci¯ed through ¯nite state
machines, which represent both authorized and permitted acts. The distinction
between authorization and permission becomes fundamental when new institu-
tions are de¯ned by using previously de¯ned institutions [37]. In fact, when a
designer de¯nes a new and independent institution, he or she can arbitrary de-
cide to constrain agent behavior by limiting authorizations or by introducing
new norms. Instead, as discussed in [37], when di®erent institutions interact, in-
stitutional actions authorized to an agent by another institution can be further
conditioned only through norms.
In the following two sections we will exemplify our model by de¯ning a FIPA-
like library of communicative acts and by formalizing the English Auction as an
arti¯cial institution.
5 A commitment-based Agent Communication Language
In this section we de¯ne a library of communicative acts, a particular type of
institutional actions, and the set of conventions necessary for their actual perfor-
mance. To be compatible with the syntax of FIPA-ACL [22], when possible we
name our communicative acts with the FIPA performative that has the closest
intuitive meaning.
Content language expressions of communicative acts are temporal proposi-
tions having an expressionType that allows us to de¯ne conditions on the kind
of expression that can be used as content of each message and as parameter of
each communicative act (see Section 3).
In the sequel, the semantics of communicative acts is partly given in terms of
preconditions and postconditions of other institutional action. In fact, most of
the communicative acts, except for declarations, di®er from institutional actions
de¯ned by the Basic Institution only because they have additional conditions
on the type of the content. Thus, we introduce two new OCL operators, precon-
dition and postcondition, to evaluate the precondition and postcondition of an
institutional action.
The act of informing, whose main point is to commit the sender of the mes-
sage to the truth value of a proposition can be de¯ned as follows:
name : Inform(sender; receiver; content)
pre : makePendingComm(sender; receiver; content):precondition
and content:expressionType = \proposition"
post : makePendingComm(sender; receiver; content):postcondition
The Inform communicative act can be performed by exchanging a message
with inform as message type:
exchMsg(inform; sender; receiver; content) =conv
Inform(sender; receiver; content)
Notice that, according to the de¯nition of makePendingCommitment pro-
vided in Section 3.1, if an agent sends the same message twice to inform a
second agent about a certain state of a®airs, only the ¯rst message will counts
as an actual Inform. This is due to the fact that the preconditions of makePend-
ingCommitment are not satis¯ed, since there exists a commitment with the same
content among the involved agents. It is also worth observing that this does not
mean that an agent cannot send multiple informs to another agent about the per-
manence or evolution of a certain situation, since it can change the time intervals
characterizing the content of the message, represented as a temporal proposition
(see Section 3), in such a way that preconditions of makePendingCommitment
are satis¯ed.
An agent may get another agent to perform an action by performing a re-
quest, which creates an unset commitment for the receiver of the message to
the performance of the action. In particular the requested action can be another
communicative act. The formal de¯nition of Request is the following:
name : Request(sender; receiver; content)
pre : makeCommitment(receiver; sender; content):precondition
and content:expressionType = \action"
post : makeCommitment(receiver; sender; content):postcondition
By sending a message with the request performative, the sender can perform
the Request communicative act:
exchMsg(request; sender; receiver; content) =conv
Request(sender; receiver; content)
Unlike most content languages, temporal propositions allow us to express
conditional commitments for the execution of an action when or whenever the
described conditions are met (for details see [9]). Thus, in our framework Request-
When and Request-Whenever coincide with Request.
The point of QueryIf is to get another agent to answer whether a state of
a®airs holds (the symbol =def means that performing the action on the left-hand
side is the same as performing the action on the right-hand side):
name : QueryIf(sender; receiver; content) =def Request(sender;
receiver; Inform(content) or Inform(not content))
This disjunctive de¯nition of QueryIf is very common, but has often been
criticized because it seems to suggest that the agent that is asked the question
may give a positive or a negative answer independently of what it believes to be
true. However, this is not the case: the answer will be produced by performing an
act of informing, and by doing so the answerer will commit to the truth of what
it says. Of course we cannot oblige the answerer to be sincere, but we capture
the fact that every false answer will bring about the violation of a commitment.
An agent can agree to perform the requested action by executing Agree, which
means setting to pending an unset commitment:
name : Agree(sender; receiver; content)
pre : setPending(sender; receiver; content):precondition
and content:expressionType = \action"
post : setPending(sender; receiver; content):postcondition
The creditor of an unset commitment can agree to do an action thanks to
the following convention:
exchMsg(agree; sender; receiver; content) =conv
Agree(sender; receiver; content)
Otherwise, an agent that has received a request (or an act that can be de¯ned
in terms of Request) can refuse it, by cancelling the unset commitment. The
de¯nition of the Refuse communicative act and the convention for its execution
are:
name : Refuse(sender; receiver; content)
pre : setCancel(sender; receiver; content):precondition
and content:expressionType = \action"
post : setCancel(sender; receiver; content):postcondition
exchMsg(refuse; sender; receiver; content) =conv
Refuse(sender; receiver; content)
As described in Section 3, a creditor of a commitment can cancel it if it has
not yet reached a ¯nal state by performing the Cancel communicative act:
name : Cancel(sender; receiver; content)
pre : setCancel(sender; receiver; content):precondition
and content:expressionType = \action"
post : setCancel(sender; receiver; content):postcondition
exchMsg(cancel; sender; receiver; content) =conv
Cancel(sender; receiver; content)
An agent can commit itself to the performance of an action by promising it:
name : Promise(sender; receiver; content)
pre : makePendingComm(sender; receiver; content):precondition
and content:expressionType = \action"
post : makePendingComm(sender; receiver; content):postcondition
exchMsg(promise; sender; receiver; content) =conv
Promise(sender; receiver; content)
Promise is not de¯ned in the FIPA communicative act library. In fact, FIPA
does not provide an act for communicating that an agent has an unconditional
intention to perform an action. Instead, FIPA describes the Propose act, whose
semantics states that the sender will hold the intention to execute an action
if the receiver of the message accepts such intention. At present, our model
does not provide any support for a commitment that should be accepted by the
creditor and, for this reason, the communicative acts related with Propose, like
Reject-Proposal, are not de¯ned in our library. Furthermore, communicative act
Con¯rm and Discon¯rm cannot be de¯ned in our model because their semantics
is related to the mental state approach of FIPA-ACL. In fact, an agent perform
a con¯rmation (or a discon¯rmation) if it knows that the receiver is uncertain
about a proposition.
All communicative acts previously described are de¯ned in terms of pre-
conditions and postconditions derived from institutional actions declared in the
Basic Institution or in terms of other communicative acts whose de¯nition ex-
ploits such basic actions. Thus, the agent that executes a communicative act,
the sender of the message, should be authorized to perform the corresponding
institutional action de¯ned in the Basic Institution.
Finally, we consider declarations, a kind of communicative act that FIPA-
ACL does not de¯ne because its semantics needs a model of institutional reality.
In fact, according to Searle's Speech Act Theory [30], declarations are the par-
ticular category of communicative acts whose point is to bring about a change in
the institutional reality in virtue of their successful performance. By de¯nition
the content of a declaration describes
precisely the institutional changes that it brings about. Therefore we de¯ne
the declaration institutional action as:
name : Declare(sender; receiver; iaction(parameters))
pre : iaction(parameters):precondition
post : iaction(parameters):postcondition
Unlike the previously de¯ned communicative acts, which are always autho-
rized for the sender of the message, only agents that are empowered to perform
an institutional action are authorized also to declare such action:
Auth(sender;Declare(sender; receiver; iaction(parameters));
Auth(sender; iaction(parameters))
We introduced the use of the Declare institutional action (even if it has the
same preconditions and postconditions of the institutional action indicated in its
content) for two reasons: for uniformity with the de¯nition of other communica-
tive institutional actions and for similarity with the human way to communicate.
The convention that binds the exchange of a declare message to the perfor-
mance of the institutional action Declare is:
exchMsg(declare; sender; receiver; iaction(parameters)) =conv
Declare(sender; receiver; iaction(parameters))
The exchange of a message of type declare can be considered as the universal
act for the performance of institutional actions. In particular every communica-
tive act de¯ned in this section can be performed also by declaring it. Further-
more, given that such communicative acts are de¯ned in terms of institutional
actions on commitments, agents can obtain the same communicative e®ects by
declaring the corresponding institutional action. This means that, at least in
principle, an ACL can be de¯ned on the basis of a single type of messages1.
6 English Auction
In this section we will brie°y describe an example (see [20] for a complete ver-
sion), concerning the speci¯cation of a widely studied interaction framework: the
English Auction. The formalization proposed exploits the conventional nature
1 Carrying out a communicative act by declaration corresponds to a performative
execution of the communicative act [32]. In human languages, however, only the
communicative acts that are completely overt may have a performative execution;
certain communicative acts, like for example the act of insinuating, cannot be per-
formed by declaration, because they intrinsically contain a concealed component.
of this type of interaction, making explicit the social concepts and rules that
constitute and regulate the interaction.
In the literature there are other attempts to specify the English Auction,
like for instance the one proposed by FIPA [21] and the one presented in a
previous work of ours [18]. But we think that the de¯nition of the English Auction
as a special institution overcomes some drawbacks of those formalizations. In
particular in the approach presented in [21] the commitments between the winner
and the auctioneer are created only when the auction is closed. On the contrary
in the current formalization and in [18] commitments are undertaken by the
agents during the auction.
Another important advantage of this approach with respect to [18] is that
the explicit formalization of the interaction context simpli¯es the content of the
exchanged messages. For instance if the context is not made explicit, the auc-
tioneer of an English Auction has to accept a bid of a participant, committing
the auction house to give the product to that participant, on condition that no
higher bids will be submitted. Otherwise the context can be made explicit for
example by introducing the role current winner and a norm that creates a com-
mitment for the current winner to pay the ask price to the auction house, and a
commitment for the auction house to give the product to the current winner of
the last round. Using this formalization, the content of the exchanged messages
for bidding and for declaring the winner are simple institutional actions, as will
be shown in the next section.
6.1 The English Auction ontology (EAOntology)
Entities The ontology of the English Auction consists of some institutional
entities represented as classes with the stereotype ins-ent in the UML class
diagram described in Figure 3. Attributes of institutional entities are depicted as
class attributes and relations among entities are represented as relations among
classes. Finally we introduce a stereotype role to represent the fact that roles
may be de¯ned relative to certain institutional entities.
The fundamental entity called EnglishAuction is identi¯ed by its id and can
assume three di®erent states: unset, during the registration phase, open and
closed. An EnglishAuction has a product that will be sold at the ask price,
which starts from the reservation price and increases until there are no more
bids or the maximum number of rounds (max round) is reached.
An agent that takes part in an English Auction can ¯ll the role of participant
or of auctioneer. In each Round, participants can only raise their Bids and the
highest bidder is declared the current winner. During one auction we assume
that an agent cannot be both a participant and an auctioneer, while it must be
a participant in order to be allowed to become a current winner. Furthermore,
all the agents that are related to the auction are gathered in the EAGroup.
Other concepts that are fundamental for every MAS, like Agent, are assumed
to be de¯ned in external ontologies.
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EAGroup«inst-entity»
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-id
-round_duration
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Fig. 3. Class diagram representing the English Auction ontology.
Institutional Actions The institutional actions that operate on EnglishAuc-
tion entities allow agents to open and close the auction, to set the current winner
or a new ask price, to open and close a round and to make a bid.
To describe an institutional action a slight extension of OCL is needed. In
fact, using the terminology introduced in [10], object oriented speci¯cations usu-
ally treat actions as events, because they only model state changes in the world.
Instead, an action is an event brought about by an agent, and may have di®erent
e®ects depending on which authorized agent has performed it. For example, the
act of bidding creates a new o®er for the bidder and not for other agents. There-
fore, we introduce a new reserved word, actor, that is used to refer to the agent
that is performing the action. Below we formally de¯ne some of the institutional
actions made available by the EAOntology. The action for opening an auction
is:
name : openAuction(auct id)
pre : UnsetEnglishAuction:allInstances()! exists(id = auct id)
post : OpenEnglishAuction:allInstances()! exists(id = auct id)
The action for setting the ask price, that can only rise, is:
name : setAskPrice(auct id; price)
pre : OpenEnglishAuction:allInstances()! exists(id = auct id
and ask price:value < price)
post : OpenEnglishAuction:allInstances()! exists(id = auct id
and ask price:value = price)
6.2 Authorizations
Participants are authorized only to make bids by executing the makeBid insti-
tutional action:
Auth(EnglishAuctionid:participant;makeBid(id; price))
When a participant is authorized, makeBid is successfully executed only if
the o®ered price is higher than the ask price and if the bidder has not yet o®ered
in the current round. Its e®ects are to increment the number of o®ers and to
create a new Bid [20].
Auctioneers are authorized to perform all other actions de¯ned by the EAOn-
tology. In particular, an auctioneer is authorized to perform all institutional
actions de¯ned in Section 6.1:
Auth(EnglishAuctionid:auctioneer; openAuction(id))
Auth(EnglishAuctionid:auctioneer; setAskPrice(id; price))
6.3 Norms
Due to space limitations we will describe the main phases that characterize an
auction, reporting only an example of the required norms.
To prevent system overload due to the exchange of useless messages, we
assume that exists a special norm that forbids registered agents to execute those
institutional actions that are ontologically impossible or that are not authorized.
This norm is ¯red during the registration phase, whenever an agent ¯lls a role.
When the start time is elapsed and if at least two agents has been registered
as participants, the following norm creates an obligation for the auctioneer to
open the auction:
within a: UnsetEnglishAuction
on e: TimeEvent(a:startT ime)
if a:participant:sizeOf() >= 2 then
foreach agent in a:auctioneer
do makePendingComm(agent; system;
(openAuction(a:id); [now; now + ±];9))
where ± is the time allowed to the agent to ful¯ll its obligation. This example
shows also that our formalization of norms not only speci¯es correct sequences
of messages, but also describes protocol timeouts. Timeouts are speci¯ed by
creating an obligation for agents to perform a communicative act before a given
time instant or by de¯ning a norm that ¯res after a period of time and which
prescribes what agents should or should not do at the next step of the interaction.
In the following phases of the interaction, the auctioneer is normally obliged
to do a speci¯c action among those it is authorized to perform, and it is forbidden
from doing any of the others. Therefore, norms concerning the auctioneer have
a recurrent pattern.
When the auction is declared open, a di®erent norm creates an obligation
for the auctioneer to set the reservation price and open a new round, during
which the participants can bid. Unlike the auctioneer, a participant has the
permission to make a bid but it is not obliged. Therefore, when a round is
opened, its commitment not to bid has to be cancelled, but no obligation to do
so is created.
After the round duration has elapsed, participants are prohibited from mak-
ing more bids, while the auctioneer is committed to close the round, and, if there
is a valid o®er, to proclaim the current winner and the new ask price, otherwise
it must close the auction.
When an agent ¯lls the role of current winner, a norm obliges it to buy the
product on sale at the price of its last bid and forces the auctioneer to sell it.
Finally, if max round is not reached the auctioneer has to open a new round,
otherwise it should close the auction.
7 Discussion
In this section we compare our approach to the de¯nition of the semantics of an
ACL and our model of norms with other proposals presented in this volume.
In [16] Flores et al. propose an ACL semantics based on four levels: composi-
tional, conversational, commitment state, and joint activity. The ¯rst level, used
to express the meaning of messages in term of commitments, characterized by
a life cycle based on states and transitions, is very close to our proposal. How-
ever, Flores et al. do not face the problem of describing the content of messages
and commitments. A further di®erence of their approach is that in order for a
commitment to become active either the debtor or the creditor has to accept it;
this is an interesting change in the life cycle of commitment that we intend to
investigate in our future works. The introduction of the other levels for speci-
fying the semantics of messages is very interesting, even if we think that these
levels do not change the semantics of messages but introduce new conditions for
the correctness of messages; such conditions look like to soundness conditions of
interaction protocols treated in [18].
In [26] Mallya and Singh propose an algebra for combining protocols to ob-
tain more °exible conversations. In their approach, commitments are viewed as
means for engineering protocols. As we showed in Section 6, norms can describe
protocols; thus it would be interesting to study in depth how di®erent institutions
can be combined, how a designer can guarantee normative coherence, or how a
conversation can reach the same communicative state by following alternative
paths.
In [25] Kagal and Finin present a preliminary model of conversation speci¯ca-
tion and policies using permissions and obligations. The approach to model and
constrain agent interactions using normative concepts is similar to the one pre-
sented in this paper, where we describe the English Auction Protocol by means
of norms that restrict the set of communicative actions available for an agent at
each step of the interaction. We did not distinguish between conversation speci-
¯cation and policies, because our norms are suitable to express both cases. Our
approach is more detailed in modelling institutional reality, which is regulated by
a set of norms; we also propose to distinguish between authorization (or power)
and permission. Kagal and Finin's declarative approach to the formalization of
norms is ¯t for developing a reasoning engine for arti¯cial agents, our operational
approach is particularly suitable to check if an agent is behaving in accordance
with the system of norms. Finally, a very interesting topic of research faced by
Kagal and Finin, that we intend to investigate in future works, is the problem
of resolving con°icts between norms using for example meta-policies.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have de¯ned what we mean by the term \arti¯cial institution",
a description of the basic concepts that constitute agent interaction systems.
Thanks to the de¯nition of commitments as institutional entities speci¯ed by
the Basic Institution, we give the semantics of most communicative acts de¯ned
by FIPA-ACL in terms of institutional actions on commitments. Furthermore, we
have discussed the crucial role played by declarations, a communicative act that
allows agents to perform every institutional action, even communicative acts.
Finally we have described norms as event-driven rules that manipulate commit-
ments, and interaction protocols as sets of norms, exemplifying our approach
through a well known interaction framework, the English Auction.
We believe that our approach helps clarifying the strict relationships holding
between language, institutional reality, and interaction rules in a MAS. More-
over, we believe that the adoption of an operational modelling style makes our
proposal reasonably easy to implement. In fact, we plan to implement our frame-
work as an extension of JADE in the near future.
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